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WHAT WENT WRONG?
THE EROSION OF RELATIVE EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT
AMONG YOUNG BLACK MENINTHE 1980s
ABSTRACT
This paper shows a widening in black-white earnings and
employment gaps among young men from the mid-l970s through the
1980s that differs among subgroups. Earnings gaps increased most
among college graduates and in the midwest while gaps in
employment-population rates grew most among high school dropouts.
We attribute the differential widening to distinct shifts in
demand for subgroups due to changes in industry and regional
employment, the falling real minimum wage and deunionisation, the
growth of the relative supply of black to white workers that was
marked among college graduates, and to increased crime, that was
marked among high school dropouts. The differential factors
affecting the groups highlights the economic diversity of black
Americans.
John Bound Richard B. Freeman
Population Studies Center NBER
University of Michigan 1050 Massachusetts Avenue
1225 South University Cambridge, MA 02138
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2590 and
and NBER Harvard UniversityFrom the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s black Americans made large gains in the labor
market relative to whites. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, affirmative action, and
court interpretation of anti-bias laws combined with a tight job market and a consensus to
redress historic inequities to raise the demand for black workers. The racial earnings gap
among young men fell, effectively disappearing for those with the same years of schooling
[Bound and Freeman, 1989; Freeman, 1976; Smith and Welch, 1986J. In ensuing years the
environment for black advancement worsened. Economic growth slackened; the
manufacturing share of jobs plummetted; wage inequality grew; and drugs and crime
pervaded many inner city neighborhoods. The Reagan Administration opposed affirmative
action before the Supreme Court and debated eliminating requirements, time tables, and
measures of compliance from Executive Order 11246. Courts made it harder to prove
discrimination.
In this study we use data from the Current Population Survey [CPS] and other sources
to examine the relative economic position of young black men in this new environment and to
assess the causes of observed changes. We focus on young men because their wages and
employment are more sensitive to current market realities than those of older workers, whose
specific human capital and seniority buffer them from market developments. Our evidence
shows that the era of relative black economic advance ended in the Mid 1970s. The racial
earnings gap for recent male labor market entrants widened from 1976 to 1989, especially
among college graduates and workers in the Midwest. Racial differences in employment-
population rates also widened. The mid-1970s Onset of erosion rules Out weakened
affirmative action as the prime cause of change. The large increase in racial earnings gaps
among college graduates and in the Midwest, where gaps had effectively disappeared in the2
early 1970s, suggests that more was involved than the overallwidening of thepaydistribution
that characterized the 1980s: a widening in the overalldistributioncould explain why lower
paid blacks fared worse relative to higher paid whites but not why blacks fared worse
compared to similarly paid whites. Finally, the decline in the relative employment of young
black men rules Out a selectivity-based explanation of the erosion of earnings given the usual
assumption that the least productive (lowest paid) workers are the first to exit employment.
What, then, went wrong? Our analysis indicates that no single race-related factor
explains the pattern of erosion. The increased differentiation of the black population post-
1964, evinced in the development of an elite of college graduates and professionals on the
one side and of labor force dropouts and criminal offenders on the other, makes any unicausal
explanation difficult to sustain. This does not, however, mean that the erosion is
inexplicable. To the contrary, we attribute much of the change to quantifiable but different
shifts in the relative demand and supply of specific groups that occurred against the backdrop
of weakened affirmative action and equal opportunity pressures. The economic decline of
inner cities, loss of manufacturing jobs, fall in the real minimum wage, and drop in union
density underlie, for example, the erosion of relative earnings among men with high school or
less education, particularly in the midwest. Growth of crime went hand-in-hand with the
joblessness of high school dropouts. Occupational downgrading, possibly due to weakened
affirmative action and shifts in demand toward the most highly skilled, and a huge increase in
the ratio of black to white college graduates reduced the relative earnings of black college
graduates. Our stress on developments that differ among groups lacks the trenchancy of a
unicausal explanation of change but has the virtue of reflecting the genuine economic
diversity of the black American community.3
1. Dimensions of chanee
Our primary source of data are the usual weekly earnings and usual weekly hours
workedquestionsof the CPS, available in usable micro form since 1973.' The Census asked
the usual earnings and hours questions of all respondents in the May surveys through 1978
and of outgoing rotation groups in all months in later years, producing differently sized
samples over time. The sample of men with less than tenyearsof potential work experience
for whom earnings data exists averages 12,000 to 15,000 from 1973 to 1978 and 40,000 and
over thereafter. The main virtue of the usual weekly data file is that since 1979 it has
roughly three times as many observations as the widely used March CPS annual earnings
data, yielding more reliable estimates of differentials. Another advantage is that the usual
weeklydatalink current pay and characteristics whereas the March survey links last years'
earnings to current characteristics2.
There are still problems with the data. First, through 1988 weekly earnings are
capped at $999, biasing downward the earnings of high earners. While potentially important
for all men, less than one percent of the young black workers on whom we focus are at the
cap. Also, in 1989 an edited earnings field capped at $1923 was available; using this field
we calculated the geometric mean weekly earnings for men at the $999 cap in 1989 and used
this figure in alt years.
Second, beginning in 1976 the CPS oversainpled small states, leading us to use
sample weights in statistical analyses, with little effect on results. It also began to report
residence in a central city as well as in a metropolitan area. To deal with this we estimated
racial earnings differentials from 1976 to 1989 controlling for central city and metropolitan
residence and from 1973 to 1989 controlling only for metropolitan residence, and obtained
similar trends, with and without central city controls.4
Third, in 1975 the Census changed its hot deck procedure3 for imputing earnings for
the 15 or so percent of whites and 20 or so percent of blacks who do not report earnings.
This change does not appear to affect our results. The fraction of imputed observations was
roughly constant over the period; regressions for 1979-89 that excluded observations with
imputed earnings gave similar trends to those with imputed data; and the Census Bureau
reports that the changed hot deck barely affected black/white earnings ratios in the year of the
change [U.S. Bureau of Census 1977].
Fourth, approximately 30 percent of young black men and 10 percent of young white
men are missing from the CPS. Many of these men are missing due to the undercount in the
decennial Census [Fay, Passel, and Robinson, 1988]; others are missing because CPS counts
of these groups fall short of the Census counts. This biases cross-section earnings and
employment differentials. As long as the undercount proportions are stable over time,
however, this need not bias trends. In any case, we can do little beyond noting the problem.
We are about the counted population.
A. Earnings and Employment-Population Differentials
To see how the relative earnings of young black men changed from the early 1970s
through the 1980s, we regressed the log of hourly earnings (=usualweekly earnings/usual
weekly hours) on a race dummy and on dummy variables for individual years of potential
employment experience4 and for individual years of education. We limited our samples to
black or white wage and salary workers with less than 10 years of potential work experience
whose major activity was working; and excluded those whose imputed hourly pay exceeded
$100 or was below $1 in 1983 dollars.
Figure I displays the resultant estimated hourly earning differentials from 1973 to
1989. The sample sizes in these regressions range from approximately 7,000 for all young5
men in 1973 to 23,000 in 1989; approximately10percentof eachyears' sampleareblack;
and the standard error of the differential is on the order of .01 to .02. The estimates show
that after narrowing from 1973 to 1976, the black/white earnings gap widened through 1981,
fell sharply in 1985, and was considerably below its peak level at the end of the decade. The
magnitude of the erosion depends on the years one compares. The gap increased by .12
points from -.06 (.02) in 1976 to -.18 (.01) in 1989; and by .07 points from -.11 (.02) in
1973 to 1989 (standard errors are in parenthesis). A regression of these points on time shows
the differential widening at 0.0057 (0.001) points per year from 1973 to 1989 (see table 2)
for a 16 year trend drop of .086 log points ( 16 x .0057).
Figure II records black-white differentials (net-of-experience and schooling) over a
longer time period, 1963-1989, in weekly earnings (= yearly earnings/weeks worked) from
the March CI'S files.5 These data show the massive decline in the black-white earnings gap
in the late 1960s-early 1970s in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
accompanying national anti-bias policies and a rough stability or modest erosion of those
gains from the mid-1970s through the end of the 1980s. Here, the black-white earnings gap
bottoms out in 1975, rises through 1983, then fluctuates. The 1989 gap of -.18 is nearly
seven percentage points greater than the 1975 minimum, but is smaller than the 1973 gap of -
.21. Because the May/outgoing rotation group files contain so many more observations than
the March files, we stress the erosion shown in the May/outgoing rotation data; if we pooled
the two data sets, the erosion shown in figure 1 would dominate.6
Figure III turns from earnings differentials to employment rates (ER). It records ER5
by race from the outgoing rotation group files, standardized for single years of experience
and single years of education. The samples in these calculations include all persons in the
relevant group who report a major activity other than attending school; this yields6
substantially larger samples than those inFigureI.Thestandardizationis basedonlogit
equationsthat estimate the effect of individualyearsofexperienceand schoolingon the
probabilitya person is employed; the figure records estimated employment ratesfora
referencegroup of menwith 5 years ofpotential work experience and12yearsofschooling.
For thisgroup black ERsfell sharplyfrom.84(1973) to .69 (1975) as the economy turned
down and recovered only to .74 in 1989. White ERs dropped from .93 (1973) to .86 (1975)
and then rose to .89 in 1989. The gap in employment rates between the groups increased
from .09 points at the beginning year to .15 points at the end.7 The picture of deterioration
inthe relativeeconomic position ofyoung black workersthusshows up in quantityas well as
price terms.
B. Differentials for Disaggregated Groups
We also estimated black-white earnings Cifferentials for men in three education
categories: high school dropouts; high school graduates; and college graduates; and in the
three regions where blacks are found in sizeable numbers: the midwest (East North Central
Census division), the northeast (New England and the Mid-Atlantic), and the south (South
Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central divisions). Our analyses controlled for
individual years of experience and schooling; our regional analysis treated high school
graduates or dropouts for whom labor markets are relatively local; analyses that include
college graduates are similar.
Table I presents the estimated racial earnings differentials from multivariate
regressions that control for individual years of experience and education for all young men
and for the disaggregated groups. It shows that the erosion in relative earnings was
exceptionally large for two groups: black college graduates and less educated men in the
midwest. Black college graduates, who in the mid-l970s earned a premium over young7
white graduates (possibly the result of affirmative action), hadsucha severe dropin relative
earningsthat by 1989 they earned 0.17 log points less than whites. Even if one discounts the
mid-1970s premium, the differential rose by .13 from the near equality established in 1973
(Cotton (1990) gives parallel results for the occupational earnings of the black male middle
classi. Since the differential among high school graduates increased by less from 1973 to
1989 (.11 points to .18 points) and by much less from its minimum value to its 1989 value
than did the differential among college graduates, by the end of the 1980s black/white
differentials for college graduates were as large as for high school graduates -- in sharp
contrast to the situation in the early/mid 1970s. The drop in relative black earnings in the
economically depressed midwest is equally striking. In 1973 the black-white differential in
the midwest was .01. In 1989, it was -.21, greater than the differential in the south where
blacks have historically fared worst.
Finally, as a concise summary of the secular trends of interest we regressed our
estimated annual earnings and employment differentials net of education and experience on a
linear time trend over 1973-89. We chose this starting year rather than a later trough to
avoid exaggerating the trend due to sampling error, and because 1973 and 1989 are at similar
points of the business cycle. The resultant trends (and their standard errors) are given in
table II for hourly earnings differentials and for employment-population rate differentials.
The estimates for education groups shows that while black high school dropouts suffered only
modest losses in relative earnings, their relative employment deteriorated greatly. The
estimates for regional groups shows that young black men in the midwest suffered sharp
drops in relative employment as well as in relative earnings.
To explain the pattern of trend erosion among groups — the exceptional decline in
relative earnings for college men and for those in the midwest; and the sharp drop in relative8
employment for blackhigh school dropouts --we use two analytictools. First,we develop a
regression based earnings decomposition model in which we add potential explanatory
variables to our log earnings regressions and estimate trends in race differentials net of those
variables. The difference between trends with/without a given variable is its contribution to
erosion. To interpret these estimated effects, we further decompose them into a part due to
shifts in employment and a part due to changes in the wage structure of the groups. Our
second method of analysis estimates the effect of shifts in fixed coefficent indices of changes
in employment among industries and demographic changes in the ratio of young black to
young white men on earnings and employment differentials in a market-clearing model.
H. Repression Decomnosition Analysis
Our regression decomposition analysis estimates the effect of changes in the following
variables on the erosion of relative black earnings: location by region and metropolitan status;
industry and occupation of employment; deunionization; and the fall in the real minimum
wage.
A. Decomposition model
To show how the decomposition works, we provide a step-by-step accounting of how
we estimated the effect of region on outcomes. First, as our starting point, we take the
estimated black-white earnings differentials in the absence of region as given in table I:
(1)ln(w)= A,+bD+c1X
where D is 1 if the worker is black and 0 if he is white; X is a vector of the variables for
individual years of experience and individual years of schooling; and t indexes year. The
coefficients b, are our measure of the hourly earnings differential in t.
Second, we estimate the racial differential net of region by adding a vector of eight9
dummy variables (R)forCensus divisionto equation (1):
(2)ln(w1J=
Here b1' is the racialearningsdifferential netofregion. The difference betweenb,'
and b, shows how region affects relative earnings in yeart.If blacks are overrepresented in
low wage regions. b1' will be less thanb1.Changes in the regional location of blacks and
whites or inregional pay differentials canlead b,'-b, to changeover time.If, for instance,
black employment becomes relatively more concentratedinlow wage regions, or if wages fall
in regions in which blacks predominate, regionwould contributetotheerosion.
Third,weestimatetrends indifferentials withand without regional controls by
regressingourannual estimatesofb and b' on linear time. The differencebetweenthe trend
coefficientforb and that for b' we identifyasthe part of the trend "due to region'.
Fourth, wedivide the effect ofregioninto "aquantity effect"due tochangesinthe
relative distributionofblacksby region anda "priceeffect" dueto changesinregional
earnings differences.To make this division we averaged the coefficientsonregion dummies
fromour annual regressionsto obtaina vector ofaverageregional wage effects,W;
multiplied this vectorbya vector ofthedifferencein theregional employment distribution of
blacks(Ru,) and whites(R,,,)to obtain a single measure oftheeffect ofregionaldistribution
on racial earnings: RQ, (= Wx(R,,-R,,J. Since WR hasnotimesubscript changesover
time inRQ, representthe effect onearningsofchangesintheregionallocation of blacksand
whitesat a constantset of prices. Regressingthe timeseries of RQ on a trend variable
yields ourestimate of the contributionofthe quantity component of regiononthe earnings
differential. The price componentofregion isthe differencebetween the fullregion trendin
b'-b and our estimated trend in RQ,.
Weperform a similaranalysis forother factors, addingthemsequentiallysothatthe10
effect of each factor's effect is measured net of the effects of those already in the regression.
The ordering is from location to industry, occupation, unionization, and the minimum wage.
The factors are sufficiently orthogonal that re-ordering has a marked effect only on
unionization and industry: if union coverage is entered first, the effect of unionism is
increased notably relative to the effect of industry.
B. Decomposition results
Table Ill gives the contribution of each factor to the annual percentage point trend in
the black-white earnings gap, as estimated by our decomposition analysis. The first line in
the table, labelled "trend", is the estimated trend in b without region controls, as in table 2.
The -.565inthe upper left column shows that there was decline in relative black earnings by
over one-half percentage point per year over the period. The next line "Due to Region"
gives our estimate of the effect of region on the trend; it is obtained by adding eight region
dummy variables to the earnings regression and estimating the trend net of region (b') as
described above. For the United States as a whole correcting for region has a negligible
effect on the adverse trend in black-white earnings differentials, raising it by .02 points
from -0.57 to -0.59. There is no effect for persons in the midwest since this is a single
Census division, and relatively little effect in the South. Region has an impact in the
Northeast, where it accounts for .25 points of the .80 erosion in relative earnings. The lines
"quantity" and "price" under 'Due to Region' estimate the effect of changes in regional
employment distribution at the average regional wage pattersn and of changes in regional
wage differentials on the trend erosion, estimated by the procedure described above. This
calculation shows that the limited regional effects are due primarily to changes in regional
wage differentials rather than to changes in regional employment distributions. The sizeable
regional effect in the Northeast reflects black concentration in the Mid Atlantic states rather11
than in NewEngland,where earnings rose rapidly in the period,rather thana shift in relative
concentration from high to low wage areas in the region.
While regional changes have relatively little effect on the trend in relative earnings in
the United States as a whole, metropolitan residence accounts for .08 points of the annual
erosion, or 15% of the trend (= .084/565) For men in the midwest, metropolitan residence
has a larger effect, reducing the trend by .19 points per year. Separating changes in the
distribution of blacks and whites from changes in pay differentials between metropolitan and
other areas shows that metropolitan residence adversely affected the relative earnings of
young blacks because relative earnings fell modestly in metropolitan areas where blacks are
exceptionally concentrated rather than because employed blacks were increasingly
concentrated in inner cities.'°
If black employment grew relatively rapidly in lower paying industries or if blacks
were concentrated in industries with declining relative wages, addition of industry controls to
the regressions will reduce estimated trends in racial differentials. Accordingly, we added 18
industry dummy variables to our earnings equations (which already controlled for location,
education, and experience) and obtained yearly net-of-industry differentials, which we then
regressed on time. The results under the item 'due to industry" in table 111 show that
industry had a moderate effect on the trend in differentials for all young men, accounting for
.06 log points of the .57 point 1973-89 erosion. As with metropolitan status, however,
industry has a massive effect on workers with high school or less education in the midwest --
accounting for over one-third of the increased racial earnings differential (.46 points of a total
drop of 1.42 points). What drives this large effect is the huge drop in the proportion of
young black workers in manufacturing." Decomposing the industry effect into its quantity
and price components following the same methodology described for region effects'2 shows12
that for most groups (college graduates are the notable exception) the industry effect is
dominated by shifts in industrial employment rather than in the industrial wage structure.
Turning to occupation,CPSdata show that the occupational attainment of young black
men worsened from 1973 to 1989 relative to that of young whites with similar years of
schooling. In the 1970s young black college graduates were as likely to be managers or
professionals as were young white college graduates; in 1988-89 black graduates were 13
percentage points less likely to be in those occupations than whites. Similarly, young blacks
with high school education were underrepresented as craftworkers but overrepresented as
operatives in the 1970s; whereas by 1988-89 they were no more likely to be operatives than
whites but had fallen further behind as craftworkers." To quanti' the effect of these and
related shifts on relative black earnings we applied our earnings decomposition analysis to
occupations, adding nine one-digit occupation dummy variables to our regressions. The
results are given in the item "occupation' in table 3. For all young men, occupation
contributed .11 points to the 1973-88 erosion. Most of this is due to the fact that blacks were
in occupations with falling relative pay rather than to disproportionate shifts of young blacks
into low wage occupations. For college graduates, on the other hand, the .30 point
contribution of occupation to the erosion was due to deterioration in the relative occupational
attainment of young blacks.
Overall, controlling for location, industry, and occupation reduces the adverse trend in
black-white earnings differentials among all young men substantially, from -.57 to -.34,
suggesting that 40% of the erosion of relative earnings is attributable to these "structural
factors'. For the two groups with the greatest loss in relative earnings, however, the
structural factors account for very different proportions of the erosion in relative earnings:13
they explain 31% of the adverse trend among college graduates compared to 57% of the
adverse trend among workers in the midwest.
C. Institutional Factors
Two changes in labor market institutions are potential contributors to erosion: falling
union density and the decline in the real minimum wage.
The fall in union density is likely to reduce relative black earnings because young
blacks were overrepresented in unions at the outset: in 1973 31 percent of young blacks were
unionised compared to 26 percent of young whites. Controlling for education and industry,
the unionisation rate for blacks was 6 points higher than for whites in the United States and
10 higher in the northeast and midwest. As union density fell, black and white unionisation
rates converged, so that by 1989 blacks were no more likely to be unionised than similarly
educated whites in the same industry.
To quantify the effect of declining black union membership on relative earnings, we
estimated black-white differentials after inclusion of a union dummy. The results, given in
the item unionisation" in table III, show that for the United States the decline in unionism
reduced the relative earnings of young blacks by just .03 log points per year --roughly5
percentof the trend. For young male workers with no more than a high school education,
however, the effect was large in regions of traditional union strength, the northeast (.11
points) and midwest (.13 points).
The decline in the real value of the minimumwagefrom 1980 to 1989 was a likely
contributing factor to the erosion in relative black earnings because young blacks have
historically been at the lower tail of the earnings distribution, where the minimum has some
bite. To estimate the effect of the declining real minimum, we simulated a distribution of
earnings for 1989 in which we held the real minimum constant from 1981 to 1989. We14
raised the reported hourly earnings of workers earning $3.35 per hour (the 1981 minimum) to
$457 in 1989 by the 36 percent rate of inflation in the CPI from 1981 to 1989; raised the
hourly earnings of workers paid less than $3.35 an hour by a similar percentage, keeping
their earnings a constant percent below the minimum; and conservatively raised the earnings
of workers earning between $3.35 and $4.57 to the new $4.57 postulated minimum. We then
estimated the black/white earnings differential controlling for experience, education, location,
industry, occupation, and union status with and without this wage adjustment. The minimum
wage effect is the difference between the differentials with and without the adjustment,
making it net of the other factors. It indicates that the black-white differential would have
been 1.55 percentage points smaller in 1989 than it was. In terms of annual trends over the
1973-89 period under study this 1.55 percentage point decline translates into -.097 percentage
points per year, accounting for 17% of the 1973-89 erosion. For high school dropouts, the
trend would have been .20 points smaller per year than it was, explaining all of the modest
drop in the relative earnings of dropouts. Among regions, the fall in the real value of the
minimum accounted for the 75% of the erosion in the south but for only 7% of the decline in
the midwest where pay levels were substantially above the minimum. As minimum wage
laws fix pay at rates above potential market clearing rates, their reduced importance in the
1980s presumably acted to raise employment. Given estimated elasticities of employment to
the minimum [Brown, 1988; Castillo-Freeman and Freeman, 19911, however, these effects
are unlikely to have been large. They were certainly too weak to offset the adverse factors
that lowered the relative employment of young black men.
All told, our decomposition does a surprisingly good job accounting for the level and
pattern of erosion. As the bottom line in table Ill shows, the decomposition explains 62% of
the erosion in relative earnings for all young men, all of the erosion for groups where blacks15
sufferedmodest declines in relative earnings, and nearly three-quarters of the massive erosion
S
forless educated workers in the midwest. By contrast, our analysis does a poor job
accounting for the declining relative earnings of young black college graduates.
HI. Demand-SuDDly Shift Analysis
An alternative way to assess the determinants of erosion is to calculate indices of
demand and supply for young black and white workers and estimate how changes inthese
indices altered relative wages and employment. On the demand side, we examine shifts that
result from differences in the industrial composition of employment of blacks and whites and
the differing growth of employment across industries.'4 For the ith (race, race-education, or
race-region) group we calculate the shift in demand (Di') as the weighted percentage growth
of employment by industry (EMP'):'5
(3) D', =E;EMP'J,
where jindexesindustry; a is the fraction of the group employed in the jth industry in the
base year; and where ;andEMP', relate to the specific group under consideration (i.e., we
use ;andEMP'J for workers in the Midwest in our analysis of those workers; a, and EMP'J
for workers in the South in our analysis of the South and so on).
To the extent that workers are overrepresented in a sector because they have a
comparative advantage in the type of work performed there, contraction will lower their
relative pay. Comparative advantage must, however, be viewed loosely to account for
differences in the industrial employment of black and white men with the same years of
schooling. Differences in industry mix between these workers presumably reflect historic
• (discriminatory) recruitment patterns, the location of industries relative to the residence of
workers, and differences in the quality of education [Card and Kreuger, 1990]. Whatever the16
reason, however, blacks are likely to suffer, at least in the short run, when sectors employing
them in large numbers contract.'6
For fixed coefficient demand indices like (3) to explain differences in the labor market
experience of workers, it is necessary that the workers have different distributions of
employment among sectors; and that sectoral growth rates of employment vary greatly. Both
of these criterion are met in our data: in the early 1970s less educated blacks are more highly
represented in manufacturing than whites, while black college graduates are overrepresented
in government employment.'7 Both of these sectors experienced substantial relative declines
in employment. In addition, however, black employment fell disproportionately rapidly in
manufacturing, particularly in the midwest where blacks went from 6 percentage points more
likely to be in manufacturing than whites in the 1970s to 10 points less likely in 1988-89.
Column 1 of table IV records the estimated growth of In demand for young black men
relative to young white men from our fixed coefficient analysis. To obtain these numbers we
chose 1973 as our base period and calculated the 1973 proportion of young blacks and of
young whites employed in each of the 18 industries used in our regressions." Then we
estimated the trend in the growth of employment in each industry (in each industry by region
in our regional analysis) by regressing each industry's share of men with 0-9 years of
potential work experience on a 1973-89 time trend. The relative demand indices in the table
are the difference between the average of the growth rates weighted by the 1973 black
employment distributions and the average of the growth rates weighted by 1973 white
employment distributions. A negative number implies that blacks were concentrated in
industries whose employment growth was less than the employment growth in industries in
which whites were concentrated; a positive number has the opposite meaning. Most of the
numbers are negative. Many are large. The estimates show that the industrial composition17
of employment shifted against black young men relative to whites by 0.33 percent per year
overall, but by much greater rates for the groups with the largest erosion of relative
earnings --collegegraduates (1.87 percent per year) and for men with high school or less
education in the midwest (1.49 percent per year).
The substantial effect of industry on the relative demand for black college graduates in
Table IV contrasts markedly, the reader will note, with the absence of a significant industry
effect for college graduates in the decomposition analysis in Table ill. The difference reflects
the different components of change that the two analyses stress. The decomposition analysis
treats a shift in employment from a low wage declining industry in which a group was
initially overrepresented as improving the groups' economic position, whereas the fixed
coefficient model treats such a decline of employment as adversely affecting demand. For
college graduates, the decomposition treats the shift of graduates from the contracting public
sector (where black graduates were highly concentrated in the 1970s) as raising the earnings
of black graduates whereas the fixed coefficient analysis treats the contraction as reducing
demand for them. Which analysis more closely reflects reality depends on the ease with
which workers obtain jobs in nontraditional sectors'.
Turning to the supply side of the market, we estimate relative supplies by the ratio of
the noninstitutional population of blacks to the noninstitutional population of whites in the
relevant group. Column 2 of table IV shows that overall the number of young blacks
increased substantially from 1973 to 1989 comparedso the number of young whites --the
result of differing patterns of baby boom births two decades or so earlier. The relative
supply increase was, moreover, greatest among groups experiencing the largest erosion of
• relative earnings: college men (blacks increased enrollment greatly due to the opportunities
and high returns for black college-going following the Civil Rights Act [Freeman, 19761);18
and men in the Midwest (possibly due to migration responses to the opportunities of the
1970s). By contrast, the ratio of black to white high school dropouts fell, while the ratio of
blacks to whites with high school or less education in the South was roughly constant.
Taken together, the direction of and magnitude of the changes in the demand and
supply indices are, with the notable exception of dropouts, consistent with the pattern of
erosion. For the overall sample, relative demand for young black mate workers decreased
and relative supply increased, with the increase in supply markedly larger in absolute value
than the decrease in demand. The largest declines in demand and increases in supply are for
college graduates and less educated men in the midwest, the groups with the greatest erosion
of relative wages. To transform the shift analysis into quantitative predictions of changes in
relative earnings and employment is, however, difficult, for it requires well-specified
elasticities of responses that our data are not rich enough to yield and that are unavailable in
existing literature. Still, we can assess crudely the quantitative fit of the model by
considering the supply and demand elasticities that would allow it to account for observed
changes. In a market clearing model, shifts in demand and supply alter relative wages by the
inverse of the sum of the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand and alter employment
to population ratios with a parameter equal to the elasticity of supply divided by the sum of
the supply and demand elasticities. Formally, defining all variables as log differentials
between blacks and whites, if Ed' = D' - hW' is the relative demand curve and E,' = S' + e
W' is the relative supply curve, market clearing yields: W'=(D'-S')/(e + h) and E'-S'= e
(D'- S')f(e+h). Given W', E', and D' (our fixed coefficient shift indicator and S' (the
change in relevant population) we can solve for the demand and supply parameters that fit
each groups' experience. Parameters of plausible magnitudes that are reasonably similar for
all the groups would lend support to the model;- whereas parameters that differed widely19
among them would raise questions about its validity.
Columns 3-4 of table IV record the trends in In earnings and employment-population
ratios necessary to calculate the implicit supply and demand parameters. Since the shift
analysis does not treat location, the trends are net of location; the earnings trends are derived
from table Ill, line 4; the employment trends differ modestly from those in table 11 because
they are for log employment-population ratios, adjusted for location. Given these statistics
and the estimated shifts in supply and demand, we calculated the implicit supply and demand
elasticities for each group. The results recorded in columns 5 and 6 show that for the groups
for which the model works elasticities are of roughly comparable magnitudes. The relative
supply elasticities are considerably below uniity. The elasticities of labor demand for black
relative to white workers are large, presumably because the comparisons are between workers
with the same education, though far from infinite.19 The failure of the model to yield
sensible estimates for the south is not a major drawbook as actual and predicted changes are
slight so that the data do not provide the variation needed to obtain reasonable estimates.
Indeed, the earnings changes were fully explained in table HI as resulting primarily from the
declining real minimum wage. The failure to account for the experience of black high school
dropouts is another matter. The fixed coefficient index shows an increase in relative demand
due to the expansion of service industries where black dropouts were initially
overrepresented, while the ratio of black to white dropouts increased. These shifts should
have raised relative employment and earnings, contrary to fact. The implication is that
factors beyond those in the shift model affected the relative economic position of black high
school dropouts. The evidence in table III suggests that the modest relative hourly earnings
decline among dropouts is attributable to the decline in the real value of the minimum wage
and the fall in unionisation, leaving the decline in relative employment of black dropouts as20
the major anomolous development. We explore next two factors that may help account for
this development: changes in unmeasured skills; and increased participation in crime.
A. UnmeasuredSkills
We find little support for the hypothesis that deteriorated labor market skills of young
blacks due, say, to poor schooling, worsened family background resources, or increased drug
use, explains their declining economic position. The notion that the school skills of young
blacks deteriorated runs into an immediate problem: standardized test scores show that on
average black achievements rose modestly relative to those of whites in the period [National
Center for Educational Statistics, 1988, p 144]. While this does not rule out the possibility
that the skills of dropouts deteriorated as the dropout share of the population declined, it
creates a hurdle for such a story, as selectivity would have to dominate changes in the mean
for the population.° The hypothesis that declining family background resources accounts
for the erosion fails because the cohorts suffering erosion were brought up priortothe big
growth in single parenting and widening family income differentials at a time when the
numbers of siblings among blacks fell and parental education increased [Kane, 1990]. As
blacks report no greater use of drugs or alcohol than whites and as drug use among youths
fell in the 1980s (National Institute of Drug Abuse, 19891 increased drug use among blacks is
not likely to have caused the deterioration. The likelihood that the CI'S undercounts persons
with drug problems also makes this explanation of erosion untenable: serious drug users are
unlikely tobein the CPS.
Twodirect CPS-basedtestsalsoleadus to reject the declining skills hypothesis. In
one test we added marital status to our regressions on the argument that if marriage is a valid
indicator of unobserved quality, and the declining skills argument were correct, its inclusion
should reduce the estimated erosion, Instead, it had essentially no effect on the coefficient on21
the race dummy variable. Further, if declining skills were behind the drop in marriage and
the loss in relative earnings, erosion would have been concentrated among unmarried men.
In fact, the reverse is true. In our second test we contrasted changes in the economic
position of black and white cohorts as they age. If erosion was due to deteriorated skills of
entering black cohorts, the relative position of older cohorts, whose skills were determined in
earlier periods, ought to be constant; in fact the relative earnings of those cohorts follows
closely the pattern in figure 121, with sizeable erosion for the youngest cohorts as they age --
a result also found in the March CPS tapes [Bound and Freeman, 1989].
B.The Crime-Employment Trade-off
Thetremendous increase in crime among young black men in the 1980s [Freeman,
19911 is another possible cause of the eroding employment of black high school dropouts.
On the one side, greater criminal opportunities may have induced some young men to forego
employment. On the other side, the deteriorated job market for the less skilled may have also
made crime more attractive, producing a cohort with criminal records that adversely affect
future employment prospects.
To see how criminal activity affects high school dropouts, we used the the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. This longitudinal survey of youths aged 14-22 in 1979 asked
detailed questions about involvement with the criminal justice system in 1980 and records
imprisonment at ensuing survey dates. Our measure of criminal behavior is based on a set of
mutually exclusive dummy variables measuring the person's most serious involvement with
the law as of 1980: incarceration, probation, conviction, charged with a crime, being stopped
by police. We supplement this with additional information on whether the respondent was
interviewed in jail or prison post-1980, which is available for all succeeding surveys. We
categorized men interviewed in jail or prison after 1980 but before the date of our regression22
as having been incarcerated, and gave them zeros in the other criminal involvement dummy
variables to maintain the dummies as a mutually exclusive set. We regressed the 0-1 dummy
variable 'employed in survey week' on the vector of crime dummies and a set of control
variables for all dropouts in the noninsitutional population in 1983 and 1988. The survey
population is aged 18-26 in 1983 and thus in the same age and experience range as our CI'S
sample.
Table V records the regression coefficients and standard errors on the criminal
involvement variables. It shows a striking adverse effect of past incarceration on
employment: dropouts currently in the noninstitutional population who had been incarcerated
have a 21 percentage point lower chance of employment in 1983 and a 17 point lower chance
of employment in 1988. Dropouts whose most severe brush with the law resulted in
probation as of 1980 have 16 and 11 points lower employment probabilities in the two years;
while those with less criminal involvement are correspondingly less adversely affected.
Analyses with other samples and data sets and with before-after longitudinal designs to
control for unobserved heterogeneity show comparable effects (Freeman, 1991], indicating
that the crime-employment trade-off is robust across data sets and specifications and cannot
be explained as resulting from fixed unobservables.
Did criminal participation by dropouts rise sufficiently rapidly in the 1980s for the
crime-employment trade-off to account for a substantial portion of the decline in the relative
employment of black dropouts? Tabulations from the 1980 Census of Population files A
show that 7.4% of 18-29 year old black male dropouts were in prison or jail in 1980. On the
basis of figures from the 1986 survey of state prison inmates [U.S. Department of Justice,
19881 73% of 18-29 year old black male prisoners were high school dropouts, and 40% of all
black male prisoners were 18-29 year old dropouts. Given that some 347,000 black males23
were in prison or jail in 1986, we estimate that 140,000 black male dropouts aged 18-29 were
incarcerated in that year. Current Population Survey data shows some 557,000 black male
dropouts not enrolled in school in l986. Thus we estimate that 20.1% of black male 18-
29 year old dropouts were incarcerated in 1989 --anincrease of 12.7 percentage points over
the 1980 proportion. Between 1986 and 1989 the prison and jail population increased by
about 20% whereas the number of 18-29 year old black dropouts not enrolled in school fell
by 10% The implication is that from 1980 to 1989 the proportion of black dropouts
incarcerated rose by more than between 1980 and 1986 --conservativelyby 15 percentage
points, by our estimates.24
Since there is turnover in the prison or jail population, with short sentences given to
many first offenders, and since some are given probationary sentences or convicted without
being sent to prison, the proportion of young dropouts with criminal records is likely to be
larger than the proportion in jail at a moment in time, and the increase in the fraction with
criminal records correspondingly greater. From the NLSY we estimate that in 1988 16.8%
of black dropouts in the noninstitutional population had been incarcerated at one time in their
life whereas 12.2% of black dropouts were in jail or prison on average in that year. This
suggests a ratio of young men with a prison record in the noninstitutional population to the
incarcerated of 1.4 to one. In addition, the NLSY data indicate that in 1980 for every
black dropout who had been incarcerated, 1.2 had been put on probation as of 1980
(unfortunately the survey did not ask about probation after 1980). Multiplying our estimated
.15 point increase in the percentage of 18-29 year old black dropouts incarcerated between
1980 and 1989 by these ratios, we estimate that the proportion of black high school dropouts
in the noninstitutional population with a prison record increased by 21 percentage points (1.4
x .15) while the proportion on probation increased by 18 percentage points.26 Multiplying24
these proportions by the relevant coefficients from column 2 of table V yields an estimated
reduction in employment by 5 points in 1989 due to the rise in the proportion with a prison
or probationary record. While crime also rose rapidly among young white dropouts, the
levels of white youth involvement are so much smaller as to have little effect on their labor
market outcomes: in 1980, for instance, 1.3% of 18-29 year old white dropouts were
institutionalized, implying negligible effects on the employment of the age group.
How much of the adverse trend in employment for black dropouts may be due to the
increased proportion with an incarceration history? In our data, the employment rate of
young black male dropouts fell from 62% in 1979 to 55% in 1989 while the employment rate
of young white male dropouts remained constant at 80%. The increased proportion of young
black dropouts with criminal records could thus account for 71% (=.051.07)of the trend.
Over the longer period, 1973-1989, the downward trend in employment population rates was
15 percentage points. As there was no rise in incarceration of young blacks in the 1970s, the
implication is that the growth of the population with a criminal record accounts for one-third
of the longer run erosion of employment. As some young men involved in crime are not
caught, however, these statistics underestimate the full reduction in employment potentially
due to crime.
C.OmittedFactors: the role ol the state
Diverse statistics show that government pressures to increase minority employment
lessened in the 1980527 and analyses of court interpretations of the law suggest that in the
mid 1970s it became increasingly difficult to win discrimination Suits [CuIp, 1985]. Although
our CPS-based analysis provides no evidence on how these developments affected black-white
differentials, there is reason to expect that they contributed to the observed erosion of gains.
Evidence that Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action help explain the huge25
improvement in relative earnings of the late 1960s-early 1970s [Freeman, 1976; Leonard,
1984; Heckman, 1989] implies by symmetry that weakened pressure would have the converse
effect. The large decline in the relative earnings and downgrading of the occupational
position of young black college men found in our data is what one would expect from firms
no longer facing an affirmative action gun, since young college men were the major
beneficiaries of the previous decades' pressures [Freeman, 1976]. Leonard's (1987] finding
that federal contractors, who have mandatory affirmative action plans, maintained the same
(roughly constant) black male share of employment as noncontractors from 1980 to 1984
when AA pressures were off whereas they increased their black share of employment relative
to noncontractors from 1974 to 1980 when affirmative action pressures were severe, is also
consistent with weakened governmental pressures contibuting to the erosion of gains.
Note also that weakened government anti-bias pressures offers a way to reconcile the
decline in the relative earnings of black college graduates with explanations of erosion based
on the overall widening of the distribution of the earnings distribution [Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce, 1989]. According to the widening distribution hypothesis blacks lost ground in
relative earnings because they were initially lower in the earnings distribution than whites
with similar measured attributes during a period when the earnings distribution widened. The
fact that young black college graduates (and the less educated in the midwest) with earnings
parity/premia with whites in the mid 1970s suffered the greatest erosion is inconsistent with
this hypothesis unless parity resulted from government (other) pressures that put blacks
higher in the earnings distribution than employers would have otherwise placed them. In this
interpretation, these young black men suffered a double hit: weakened affirmative
action/equal employment activity that removed the pressures that put them high in the
distribution; and the widening distribution of earnings among college graduates itself.26
IV,Conclusion
This study has documented that the relativeearnings andemployment of young black
men declined from the mid 1970s through the 1980s and found that the rate of erosion of past
gains differed markedly across education groups and regions. Black college graduates and
blacks with high school or less education in the midwest had the biggest losses in relative
earnings while dropouts had the largest drop in relative employment. We used two analytic
techniques to examine the pattern of erosion among those groups: a regression decomposition
analysis that accounts for changes in relative earnings by changes in the structure of
employment and wages of groups; and a demand-supply shift analysis that accounts for
changes by shifts in industry employment and in relative supplies. Despite the differing
aspects of change stressed by the two procedures, they told a fairly consistent story of the
causes of erosion. Both show that different economic forces affected different groups of
young blacks. For those in the midwest, the decomposition analysis direct attention at
changes in the industry and occupation composition ce jobs, decline in unionism and the real
minimum wage, and the growth of relative supply as major contributors to erosion. On the
demand side, our analysis supports William J. Wilson's (1987) stress on the decline in
manufacturing as a major cause of the problems faced by young black men in that region.
For college graduates, the analyses directs attention at changed occupational composition,
shifts in industry demand, and the growth of relative supply as the prime factors at work,
with weakened affirmative action a likely cause of the occupational downgrading. For high
school dropouts, the decline in the minimum wage explains the modest drop in relative
earnings while increases in the proportion of young blacks with criminal records is a major
cause of reduced employment. If our interpretation of the evidence is correct, relying on asingle race-related factor toexplain changes, as is the practice in traditional discrimination
literature,isno longeradequate.ThereIstoo much diversityin theblack economic
experiencefora single factor storyofchangeto stand uptoscrutiny.
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Endnotes
1.The CPS first asked these questions in 1969 but data prior to
1973 are reported in broad intervals and are thus not readily
useable.
2. The March CPS asks respondents annual earnings and weeks worked
over the past calendar year; the data from 1964 to the present are
available in micro files.Until 1976 the CPS did not include
continuous measures of weeks or hours worked, so that estimates of
hourly or weekly earnings are subject to measurement error due to
the bracketing of earnings and hours before 1976. The yearly
earnings data in the Annual Demographic Files tell a similar story
to the one in this paper [Bound and Freeman, 1989].
3. The hot deck procedure is the method the Census uses to impute
earnings for individuals who do not report earnings. It matches
them with people having similar characteristics and imputes for
them the earnings of the matches.
4.Potential experience was defined as mm [age—l8,age—education—6].
S.Because blacks have less schooling than whites, differentials
based on regressions that include controls for education are
invariably smaller than those without education controls. In the
1960s and 1970s the difference between the two sets of estimates
fell as the black—white education gap narrowed substantially. In
the 1980s, by contrast, there was a roughly constant gap between
differentials with and without education controls. This is not
because educational attainment narrowed less in the l980s ——it
narrowed about as much as in the l970s ——butbecause returns to
schooling rose, benefitting the more educated whites by enough to
of fset the effects of the reduced gap.
6. We examined whether the difference in the 1973-1989 trend in
relative earnings shown in Figure I and Figure II is due to Figure
I treating hourly earnings while Figure II treats weekly earnings.
Our analysis shows the contrary: that the trend in racial earnings
differentials is greater in usual weekly earnings than in usual
hourly earnings. We also examined whether seasonal or rotation
effects on earnings created an incompatibility between the data
from the May CPS and that from the Annual File by looking rotation
effects on the race coefficient using the May Tapes from 1973
through 1978 and looking for calendar month effects in the Annual
files. We found no such effects.
7.This pattern isfoundin the raw(unstandardized)
employment/population rates and in comparable published data for
similar age groups [U.S. Department of Labor, 1989).32
8. The fact that the racial earnings differential rose more rapidly
for college graduates than for high school graduates does not,
however, imply that the returns to college—going fell for blacks.
The returns to college rose for both whites and blacks, but they
rose much less rapidly for blacks.
9. The earnings differentials are from table I; the employment
differentials are from logistic equations that standardize for
experience and schooling, as in figure III.
10. In the underlying regressions the coefficient on metropolitan
status fell modestly, but it has a relatively large effect because
young black men are 50 percentage points more likely to be in
central cities than comparable young whites.
11. Our data shows that in the mid-l970s over 40% of young black
men in the midwest were employed in durable manufacturing. By 1989
this had fallen to 12% --a28 point drop! By contrast, among
young white men in the midwest the drop in durable manufacturing
employment was just 10 percentage points.We suspect that an
important part of this differential change is the closing of older
plants in the central cities of the midwest.
12. That is, we average industry coefficients from our annual 1973—
89 regressions; form the vector product of these differentials with
differences in the shares of blacks and whites in each industry;
regress the resultant effect on time to obtain the trend effect of
changes in industry employment on earnings differentials; and
derive the effect of changes in industry pay as a residual,
13. We group 1970—79 for reasons of sample size in these
comparisons. Our figures show that in 1970—79 68% of black college
graduates were in professional/managerial jobs, whereas in 1988—89
46% were in such jobs. The comparable figures for white college
graduates are: 1970—79: 69%; 1988—89, 59%. In 1970—79 16% of black
high school graduates were in crafts jobs and 32% were operatives
(including transportation), while in 1988—89 14% of blacks high
school graduates were in crafts jobs and 23% were in operative
jobs. In 1970—79 27% of white high school graduates were
craftsworkers and 27% operatives; in 1988—89 the percentages were
28% (craft) and 22% (operatives).
14. It is possible, of course, to examine shifts in demand due to
changes in the occupational mix, as well, just as we examined
occupation in our decomposition analysis. Such an extension would
presumably add to the explanatory power of the shift model.
15. This formulation follows directly from the usual fixed
coefficient demand index in which the shift in demand equals the
sum of fixed ratios of the group to total employment in sectors
multiplied the absolute growth of employment in those sectors. It
is simply the percentage change analogue of that relation.33
16. For displaced workers the costs of adjustment are loss of
sector specific skills and the need to search for new jobs. For
young entrants the costs are less clear: loss of networks into
jobs, potential geographic mobility when industries are locally
concentrated. If blacks are in industries where discrimination is
least, there is the additional cost of finding employers or co-
workers with minimal prejudice.
17. The percentage of young blacks in manufacturing was 33% in
1970—79 and 20% in 1988—89; the percentage of young whites in
manufacturing was 28% in 1970—79 and 23% in 1988—89. The
percentage of young black college graduates in education and public
administration was 38% in 1970—79 and 17% in 1988—89; the
percentage of young white college graduates in those sectors was
28% in 1970—79 and 14% in 1988—89.
18. Had we used an average of a for the 1973-79 period we would
have obtained similar results.
19. To some, the implied elasticities may seem low, as blacks and
whites with the same years of schooling should, absent unmeasured
differences in school quality, be nearly perfect substitutes. We
explored this issue with data from the 1970 and 1980 Censuses of
Population and found support for the notion that young blacks and
whites with similar years of education are imperfect substitutes.
Using data on the 31 states with a high concentration of blacks, we
regressed changes in black—white earnings differentials on changes
in relative demand indices (defined as in equation (3)). Depending
on specification the estimated coefficients on the demand indices
were between .44(.29) and .50(.26) for college graduates and
between .77(.38) and 1.24(.4l) for high school graduates and
dropouts combined. These coefficients are consistent with modest
elasticities of demand, implying imperfect substitution between
black and white workers
20. Another possibility is that the tendency of the armed forces
to draw disproportionately on able black young men may have reduced
the qualifications of young black men in the civilian work force.
While there is evidence that the fraction of black and white
military recruits with high AFQT scores rose in the 1980s, the
proportion of 20-29 year old black men in the armed forces fell
from 10% in 1979 to 8% in 1988, while the proportion of 20—29year
old whites in the military was virtually unchanged at about 5%.
(U.S. Department of Defense, 1982, and Unpublished Updated
tabulations) Thus,any adverse military effect on the
qualifications of blacks in the noninstitutjonal population would
have to come through the change in the proportion with high AFQT
scores. We simulated what might happen to earnings given normal
distributions of AFQT scores for whites and blacks (with whites
having 1 standard deviation higher means) and the observed changes
in the proportions in the military and in the AFQT scores of
military recruits for the two populations. Our estimate is that
the military accessions had at most a negligible .001 effect on
relative earnings.34
21. We estimated racial earnings differentials for the age cohorts
that had 0—9 years of experience from 1973, 1979, and 1983, and
compared trends in racial earnings differentials for these cohorts
over time. For instance, we compared the differentials for men
with 0—9 years of experience in 1973 with figures giving the
differential for men with 15-24 years of potential experience in
1988. The data showed that during the 1973—89 period of erosion in
earnings the relative earnings of older cohorts of black workers
fell roughly as much as did that of entering cohorts.
22. In addition, we examined the effect of past incarceration
experience on earnings of dropouts: for 1983 we have negligible
statistically insignificant effects; for 1988 sizeable effects. As
other data sets show little impact of incarceration on future
earnings for youths from the same poverty neighborhoods (Freeman,
1991], we focus solely on the employment relation.
23. To get the number of black men in prison in 1986 we took the
number of males in state and federal prisons from the U.S. Bureau
of the Census Statistical Abstract 1990 table 328 and the number in
jail from table 323. We multiplied the prison figures by 0.47, the
proportion of proportion of state prison inmates in table 323. To
get the number of black men in jail we took 41% of the number of
men in jail from table 323.Our estimates of the high school
dropout population are based on our own calculations of the
proportion of 18-29 year olds not enrolled in school and civilian
noninstitutional population figures in Bureau of Labor Statistics
Employment and Earnings, Jan 1987.
24. This is a conservative figure. The black proportion of men in
jail rose between 1986 and 1989 so that the black male prison
population increased more rapidly. However, we lack data on the
educational distribution of these prisoners. Adjusting our
estimated .20 incarceration rate by the 20% increase in the overall
prison and jail population and by the 10% drop in black dropouts
yields a 1989 incarceration rate of .266, for a 1980—89 trend
increase of 19.2 percentage points.
25. The Sentencing Project (table 1, p. 8] estimates from Justice
Department data that among 20-29 year old blacks, 8% were
incarcerated in 1989, 12% were on probation, and 3% were on parole,
implying that there were roughly 1.9 times as many persons on
parole or probation as in jail or prison. This is of comparable
magnitude to our estimates.
26. Some of those who were on probation committed additional
offenses and went to prison: 17% in our black dropout sample.
However, others who were not on probation in 1980 were convicted of
crimes and given probationary sentences in later years. Thus, our
use of the 1980 ratio of persons on probation to those incarcerated
is only a crude approximation.
27. The number of employment discrimination suits in federal
district courts stabilized in the 1980s at about 9,000 per year
after having risen rapidly (Administrative Office of U.S. Courts);35
the number of class action discrimination suits fell; and most
employment discrimination cases involved termination rather than
hiring (Donahue and Siegeiman, 1989). From 1979 to 1985 the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which monitors Title VII,
reduced its staff by 20 percent while holding real expenditures
virtually constant; and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance,
which administers afffirmative action, reduced its employment by 10
percent and its real budget by 20 percent (Leonard, 1987).36
Table I:
Estimated Black—white Earnings Differentials. 1973—89
(controlling for years of experience and years of schooling)
United States Region (High school or Less)
Total Dropouts High College Midwest Horth South
school Grad East
1973 —.109—.179—.109—.038 .008—.004—.150 1974 —.107—.167—.138 .067 —.065—.006—.168
1975 —.076—.129—.106 .059 .079 .044—.142







1984 —.153—.180 —.171—.133 —.083—.115—.202
1985 —.190—.222—.201—.151 —.155—.071—.226




Source: Calculated from May CPS files from 1973 to 1978 and from Annual
Demographic Merged Files from 1979 to 1989. All the regressions include
controls for individual years of potential experience, years of schooling, 8
region dussnies snd a duzmny for metropolitan status (1973—75) or one for
central city and one for suburbs (1976—89) .Thestandard errors on the
estimates range from .01 to .02 for the total and from .01 to .06 for the
disaggregated groups. Detailed susmaary statistics for the beginning year
1973 and end year 1989 are:
US Hiohs School Grads or less
All College High Dropouts Northeast Midwest South
gradsgrads
1973
sample size 7029147928571249 867 896 1424
number blacks 640 52 201 187 62 86 289
std error
of differential .017 .060 .024 .034 .052 .042 .027
1989
sample size 23412564292593120 2751 2059 4328
number blacks 2503 3401204 325 273 193 851
std error
of differential .009 .025 .013 .022 .025 .029 .014TABLE II:
Regression Estimates of 1973—89 Trends in Black/White
Differentials (Net of Years of Exoerience and Years of
Schooling) X l00
Ln Earnings Snip/Pop
const trend const trend
United States, by education
total —8.43 —0.57 —12.01 —0.35
(0.92) (0.10) (1.40) (0.15)
College 6.96 —1.55 —3.57 —0.20
Graduates (1.85) (0.20) (1.09) (0.12)
High school —11.23 —0.45 —13.01 —0.25
Graduates (0.93) (0.10) (1.06) (0.20)
Dropouts 15.73 —0.21 —15.66 —0.95
(1.11) (0.12) (1.86) (0.20)
High School Graduates andDropoutsBy Region
Midwest 3.53 —1.42 —16.78 —0.88
(1.82) (0.19) (2.55) (0.29)
North East —0.19 —0.80 —19.16 0.06
(1.39) (0.15) (2.52) (0.27)
South —15.01 —0.24 —7.45 —0.66
(1.23) (0.13) (1.73) (0.18)
a All the coefficients have been multiplied by 100 for
ease of presentation. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
Source: Calculated by regressing estimated annual
racial differentials on a time trend variable. The
underlying differentials in the employment equations
are obtained from logits with single years of
experience and education. The reference groups was men
with 5 years experience and 16 years of schooling for
college graduates, 12 years of schooling for high
school gradutaes), and 10 years of schooling for
dropouts; 12 years of schooling for the region groups.
3738
Table III:
Estimated Contribution of Factors to Average Annual Percentage Point Trends in
Racial Earnings Differentials. Men With 0—9 Yrs of Exterience. 1973—89
United States Region (H.S. or lass
TotalCollege High Drop- Hid North South
Grad Sch Grad out West East
1. Initial Trend —.565—1.547 —.449—.208—1.424—.797—.241
LOCATION
2.Due toRegion .022 —.113 .052 .198 — —.246 .032
Quantities .005 —.021 .001 .033 — .000—.002
Prices .017 —.092 .051 .165 — —.246 .034
3. Due to Metro. —.084 —.054 —.094—.090 —.188 —.053—.046
Quantities .023 .009 .010 .047 .001.059 .010
Prices —.107 —.063 —.103—.137 —.187 —.112—.056
4. Trend Net of Loc. —.503—1.380 —.408—.317 —1.236 —.497—.227
EMPLOYMENTSTRUCTURE
5. Due to Industry—.057 —.108 —.045—.106 —.455 —.140 .062
Quantities —.087 .029 —.105—.133 —.491 —.033—.031
Prices .029 —.137 .060 .027 .036 —.106 .093
6. Trend Net of led. —.445—1.272 —.362-211 .781.357 .289
7. Due to Occupn —.109 —.295 —.157 .018 —.163 .043—.107
Quantities —.021 —.231 —.040 .058 —.047 .034—.015
Prices —.088 —.064 —.117—.040 —.116 —.076—.091
8. Trend net of Einp. —.336 —.976 —.205—.229 —.619 —.315—.183
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
9. Due to Union —.027 —.024 —.046—.047 —.126 —.108—.058
Quantities —.026 —.018 —.050—.049 —.125 —.121—.051
Prices —.001 —.006 .004 .002 .001 .013—.007
10. Due to Mm wage —.097 —.042 —.120 —.203 —.101 —.034—.181
TOTAL ACCOUNTING
11. Trend net of
Instit. Change —.212 —.910 —.039 .021 —.392 —.173 .056
12. Percent explained62 41 91 100+ 72 78 100+
Source: Calculated from regression analyses using CPS files as described in the
text. Note that initial trend and all succeeding regressions include duinzuy
variables for individual years of schooling and experience.Table IV:
Effects of Annual Shifts in Ln Relative Demand Indices and
Supplyon Trends in Black—White Ln Earningsand Emolovlnent—Rpte
DifferentialsNet of Location. 1973—89



















All Young males—.33 .87 —.50 —.32 .64 1.8
By education
College Grads —1.87 3.19 —1.38 —.64 .46 3.2
High School
Grads
—.77 1.41 —.41 —.22 .54 4.8
Dropouts .44 —1.53 —.32 —2.11 * *
By Region (HighSchool orLeas)
Midwest —1.49 .67 —1.24 —.48 .39 1.3
Northeast —.51 1.50 —.50 —.26 .52 3.5
South .06 —.08 —.23 .14 * a
These are the elasticities that enable the shift model to explain
perfectly the changes in relative earnings and in the in employment
rate.
A (*) indicates that the model does not account for the changes.
Source: Authors tabulations, as described in the text. The actual
changes are changes after controlling for region and metropolitan
status, as given in Table III.
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TableV:
Estimates of the Effect of Criminal Records on
Workingin Survey Week of Young High School DropoutMen
in the Noninstitutional Pooulation
1983 1988
mean coefficient mean coefficient
(std error) (std error)
dependent variable .61 —— .79 ——
incarcerated
in prior yrs .11 —.21 .16 —.17
(.06) (.04)
1980/earlier:
probation only .12 —.16 .10 —.11
(.05) (.05)
convicted only .03 —.07 .02 —.06
(.10) (.09)
charged only .07 —.03 .07 —.10
(.07) (.05)





Notes: Estimated using 1989 wave of National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.
Controls include: age, age—squared, dwniey for race, dummy for marital status,
threeregion dummies. years of schooling, urban dummy, smsa dummy, two dummies
for level of unemployment in local labor market, dummy ifpersoncame from the
"random'Ssample of the survey as opposed to the special oversampling of minority











Figure 1: BlackiWhite Earnings Gap for Men with less than 10
yrs Experience - 1973-89 (controllIng for education)
years
0
-0.2Figure 2: Black/White Weekly Earnings Gap for Men with less













Notes:Figure 2 reference category is men with 5 years of experience and 12
years of education.
42Figure 3: Black and White Employment Rates for Men with less
than 10 yrs Experience - 1973-89
years
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